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Abstract
In this note we study the distortions in an endogenous growth model developed 
by Grimaud and Tournemaine (2007), where new pieces of knowledge are 
produced in a R&D sector and used to reduce pollution emissions. Using this 
model along with a realistic calibration, we conclude that the economy strongly 
underinvests in R&D, such that the policy maker would need to implement a 
strong tax-subsidy scheme to correct it. We suggest that a subsidy to human 
capital can also decrease the gap between market and optimal allocations.
JEL Classification: O13, O15, O31, O41, Q50.
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Resumen
Esta nota estudia las distorsiones en el modelo de crecimiento endógeno de 
Grimaud y Tournemaine (2007), en el que el conocimiento se genera en el 
sector de I+D y es usado para reducir la emisión de polución. Utilizando 
una calibración realista, concluimos que se subinvierte en I+D, lo que podría 
corregirse con un esquema fuerte de impuestos y subsidios. Sugerimos que un 
subsidio al capital humano podría reducir la brecha en las asignaciones de 
mercado y las óptimas.
Clasificación JEL: O13, O15, O31, O41, Q50.
Palabras clave: Polución, impuesto ambiental, I+D, crecimiento, subsidios.
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1. Introduction
This article quantifies the distortions present in the model of R&D endogenous 
growth with pollution, due to Grimaud and Tournemaine (2007). These authors 
presented an endogenous growth model with R&D and human capital accumulation 
to link environmental policy and economic growth and allocations, where 
knowledge-driven R&D activity results in technological knowledge used to reduce 
pollution emissions, and where pollution has a negative effect on welfare. This 
follows several articles beginning with Stokey (1998), which considers negative 
effects of pollution on utility and analyze pollution-related externalities and the 
related policies. Grimaud and Tournemaine (2007) present a quite innovative 
setup to study the interactions between environmental policy and growth in which 
human capital is considered a consumption good, firms compete ‘a la Cournot’ 
and simultaneously perform R&D and sell the differentiated good. The authors 
conclude for an unusual effect of environmental tax on the economic growth 
rate. This effect, which is due to the view of human capital as a consumption 
good, has important policy implications.
When quantifying the effects of the distortions in the innovative model 
purposed by Grimaud and Tournemaine (2007), our paper must be seen as 
a note on theirs. Moreover, this note also contributes to a large literature on 
the optimality of investment in R&D (for a revision see Alvarez-Paleaz and 
Groth, 2005 and Reis and Sequeira, 2007). Quantification in R&D-driven 
endogenous growth models with natural resources or pollution has been rarely 
implemented in the specific literature, despite its importance. In fact, the 
precise policy implications from these models can only be complete through 
numerical exercises. We pursue this line in this article. The unique article that, 
to our knowledge, quantifies the R&D distortions present in an endogenous 
growth model with pollution is a recent one from Ferreira-Lopes et al. (2011), 
which used a model with different assumptions. Differently to what have been 
done in that article, this work focuses on the role of markups and technological 
externality, includes policy instruments such as taxes and subsidies. A unique 
feature of this model is that it internalizes several common distortions (such as 
spillovers, duplication effects, and creative destruction), and isolates the effect 
of markups and in particular of the technological distortion.
We provide a quantification of externalities in this endogenous growth model 
and show that the presence of a non-competitive market for differentiated goods 
and R&D together with a negative effect of pollution emissions on the consumers’ 
utility lead the decentralized equilibrium solution to allocate fewer resources 
to R&D than the optimal solution, when considering reasonable values for the 
tax-subsidy scheme. For a reasonable calibration and with a moderate effect of 
technology in reducing emissions, the decentralized economy allocates less 20% 
of resources to R&D than the social planner would do. Increasing the effect of 
technology on pollution reduction would increase the underinvestment to near 
40% less resources allocated by the market to the R&D sector.
The following section presents the model. Section 3 shows the main 
variables under social planner’s framework and under the decentralized 
equilibrium. In section 4 we carefully calibrate the model and quantify the 
distortions. Section 5 presents an alternative policy to achieve the optimal 
solution. Section 6 concludes.
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2. Model
For completeness, in this section, we briefly describe the model of Grimaud 
and Tournemaine (2007).
2.1. Production
Each quantity of the differentiated consumption good j ( j = 1, …, N), produced 
in j exogenous sectors, by firm qj (qj = 1, ..., Qj  identical firms), is achieved 
by using the technology: =Xqjt AHqjt
x , where A > 0 is a production productivity 
parameter and Hqjt
X  is the portion of human capital employed in the production 
of differentiated consumption good j by firm qj. Each firm also engages in R&D 
activities, which produces new knowledge, used to reduce pollution emissions. 
The accumulation of new knowledge assumes: δ= φZ H Zqjt qjtZ t
.
, where Zqjt is 
the stock of knowledge of firm q operating in sector j, Hqjt
Z  is human capital 
employed in research activities in firm qj, ∑∑=
==
Z Zt qjtqj
Qj
j
N
11
 is the aggregated 
stock of knowledge of the economy, δ > 0 is a productivity parameter for research 
activities, and φ< <0 1  is a measure of spillover externalities.
New knowledge is employed in the reduction of pollution, which is caused 
by the productionof the differentiated consumption good. Each firm qj produces 
pollution emissions in the following way: = β−E X Zqjt qjt t  where β > 0.
2.2. Consumers
In this model population is constant and individuals are identical. Individuals 
accumulate human capital by going to school: ψ=H Ht t
H
.
, where ψ > 0 
is the productivity of the education sector and HH is the portion of human 
capital dedicated to attending school. Consumers derive utility from the 
consumption of goods and a cleaner environment and also from human capital: 
U = ln cjt( )
α
j=1
N
∑⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥+εlnHt −ωlnEt
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥0
∞
∫  e−ρdt , where α ω< < > c0 1, 0, jt is the per 
capita purchase of each differentiated consumption good j, ∑∑=
==
E Et qjtqj
Qj
j
N
11
 
is the total flow of pollution emissions, ρ is the rate of time preferences (where 
ρ ψ< <0 ), and ε  is the effect of human capital in utility. There is no investment 
in this model, hence every differentiated consumption good j is consumed, such 
that =c Xjt jt , where ∑=
=
X Xjt qjtqj
Qj
1
. Since it can be divided into skills for final 
good production (HX), school attendance (HH), and doing R&D (HZ), and by 
assumption the different human capital activities are not done cumulatively, we 
have = + +H H H Ht t
H
t
X
t
Z , where ∑∑=
==
H Ht
X
qjt
X
qj
Qj
j
N
11
 and ∑∑=
==
H Ht
Z
qjt
Z
qj
Qj
j
N
11
.
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3. Allocations
3.1. Optimum
Given that at the optimum, the number of firms in each sector, Q, is given, 
the social planner problem is to maximize the utility function subject to the 
aggregated production function of good j X jt = Xqjt = AH jt
x
qj=1
Qj
∑( ) , the aggregate 
production process of knowledge ∑∑ δ= =

φ==Z Z H Zt qjt tZ tqj
Qj
j
N. .
11
, the total flow 
of pollution emissions Et = Eqjt =qj=1
Qj
∑j=1
N
∑ X jtZt−βj=1
N
∑( )  and the human capital 
static constraint. We refer to the Grimaud and Tournemaine (2007) article for 
the details of the social planner problem. From that problem we can obtain the 
following equations that relate the share of human capital in the human capital 
accumulation =



l
H
H
H t
H
t
 with the share of human capital in the differentiated 
goods sector =



l
H
H
X t
X
t
, and with the share of human capital allocated to the 
R&D sector =



l
H
H
Z t
Z
t
, which are presented in section A.2 of Grimaud and 
Tournemaine (2007):
(1) ψ ρ ψβω
ω φ+ = − −l
l l
l(1 )(1 )
,H
H X
Z*
* *
*
and
(2) ψ ρ ψε
ω
ψ+ =
−
+l
l
(1 )
.H
X
*
*
These expressions and the human capital restriction = − −l l l1X H Z  allows 
to obtain the shares of human capital.
3.2. Decentralized Equilibrium
In  the  decentralized  equilibrium  both  consumers  and  firms  have 
choices  to  make.  Consumers  maximize  the  intertemporal  utility  function 
subject  to  the  human  capital  constraint  and  the  budget  constraint:
∑ σ( ) ( )= + − − − +
=
B rB w H H p c T1t t t t t
H
jt jt jt tj
N.
1
, where Bt  is wealth, rt  is the 
interest rate, wt is the wage rate, which we will set equal to 1, pjt is the price of 
good j, σjt is the subsidy to the consumption of differentiated goods, and Tt  is 
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a lump-sum transfer. Note that, although pollution influences utility, there is 
nothing in the consumer choice affecting pollution directly, so that the consumer 
does not consider its evolution. This will be a source of externalities from the 
production to the consumption side.
Each firm qj produces and sells differentiated consumption goods on a 
non-competitive market (Cournot style, i.e., firms simultaneously choose their 
quantities without knowledge of the other firms’ choices) and also knowledge. 
Let qjtπ  be the profit of firm qj without payment of the knowledge 



V Zt qjt
.
. 
Hence, each firm maximizes profits p X p E H V Z Hqjt jt qjt t jt qjt qjt
X
t qjt qjt
.Zπ τ= − − + −  
After making the necessary substitutions, the firm chooses X H, ,qjt qjt
Z  and the 
willingness to pay for new knowledge υqjt. The free-entry condition in the 
market for differentiated consumption goods implies that V Z 0.qjt qjt t qjt
.
π π= − =
A symmetric equilibrium at steady-state is when there is a number of firms in each 
sector j, quantities and prices for each differentiated consumption goods are identical 
for all qj and for all j such that: Qj = Q for all j, = = = = =X X Q X Q l
l
Q
l
NQ
/ / , ,qjt j t qj
X j
X X
 
= =l
l
Qqj
Z j
Z
, l
NQ
,
Z
 ( )= = = =Z Z Q Z NQ E E Q E NQ/ / , / / ( ),qjt jt t qjt jt t  for all qj 
and for all j; υ= =p p ,jt t qjt υ υ ( )= = =Q NQ V V Q V NQ/ / , / / ( )jt t qjt jt t  for all 
qj and for all j. We refer to Grimaud and Tournemaine (2007) for details of the 
decentralized equilibrium problem.
The existence of a steady-state at the decentralized equilibrium requires that 
the term τ β−Zt t  is constant over-time. Hence, we assume that the government 
chooses a growth path for τ  such that β=τg gZ  at any period in time, implying 
that τ τ=β β− −Z Zt t 0 0   for all t, where τ0 and Z0 are respectively the initial values 
of τt and Zt. From that problem, we can obtain the following equations, which 
are presented in section A.1 of Grimaud and Tournemaine (2007):
(3) ψ ρ
ψβ τ
τ φ α
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )+ = − − + −
β
β
−
−
l
l Z
Z Q
l
l1 1 1 1
,de
H de
H
de
X
de
Z
0 0
0 0
(4) ψ ρ ψε σ
τ α
ψ( )( )
( )
( )+ =
−
− + −
+β−l
l
Z Q
1
1 1 1
,de
H de
H
0 0
(5) 
α( )( )+ = + −l l
l
Q1 1
.de
X
de
Z de
X
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The shares of human capital allocated to the different sectors in the decentralized 
equilibrium, presented in Proposition 1 of Grimaud and Tournemaine (2007), are:
(6) 
ψε σ ψ ρ τ
ψ τ ψε σ
( )
( )
( )( )
( )=
− + − −
− + −
β
β
−
−
l
Z
Z
1 1
1 1
,de
H 0 0
0 0
(7) 
βρ τ
φ ψ τ ε ψ ρ σ
( )
( ){ }( )( ) ( )= − − + + −
β
β
−
−
l
Z
Z
l
1 1 1
,de
Z
de
H0 0
0 0
(8) = − −l 1 l l .de
X
de
H
de
Z
The differences between the social planner and the market solution are due 
to the effect of technologies on pollution, which is in fact the reason to have 
allocation of human capital to the R&D sector in this model.1 Contrary to what is 
common in the endogenous growth literature, spillovers in R&D do not constitute 
a distortion in the economy. The reason is twofold: each firm uses its own R&D 
and internalizes its effect and R&D is not used to produce goods, it is only used 
to reduce pollution. These particular features of the model are useful to isolate 
the less studied effects of market power and of technological externality.
4. Quantitative Results
This section is the core of this note, implementing a quantitative evaluation 
of the distortions in the model. The calibration procedure performs a careful 
comparison between the parameters in the model and the available data.
4.1. Calibration procedure
Some of the parameters needed to calibrate this model have been used by 
previous articles. For the discount rate ρ we use a typical value of 0.02. For 
spillovers in R&D we use φ = 0.4 , which is more appropriate for models in 
which human capital accumulation is present, as empirical evidence suggest, an 
argument also followed by Reis and Sequeira (2007). In fact, recent empirical work 
that includes human capital, reveals lower values for national and international 
spillovers than the ones that have been reported before. According to results 
in Barrio-Castro et al. (2002), domestic spillovers in the presence of human 
capital decrease nearly 55% when compared to the model without human capital.
1 For a complete comparison between allocations in the decentralized equilibrium and in 
the social planner solution, we need to acknowledge that the growth rates are equal in 
both solutions.
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For ω  we use the value presented in Stokey (1988) of 0.833. For the effect of 
human capital in utility (ε ) and for the productivity of human capital allocated 
to attending school (ψ ), we set it in order to obtain both a reasonable per capita 
growth rate of 1.85% (see e.g. Maddison, 2003) and a reasonable share of human 
capital in the human capital allocation sector. Gloom and Ravikumar (1998) 
estimated that this share can be as high as 60%, although considering that this 
is a generous estimation (Gloom and Ravikumar, 1998, p. 320). Jones et al. 
(1993, p. 500) indicates estimations for the share of time spent at school and 
on-the-job training on hours worked that oscillate between 37% and 42%. We 
assume an intermediate value of 50%. This implies ψ = 0.0378 and ε = 0.0792. 
For the fiscal instruments we assume a value of τ = 0.0285,which is the average 
environmental taxes revenue as a share of GDP (data from 1997) (European 
Commission, 2001, Table 5). For the subsidy for the differentiated goods demand, 
we assume σ = 0. Usually, the subsidies to differentiated goods are given to the 
production of those goods. However, we may note that the value for the subsidy 
to physical capital costs is difficult to calculate, as was admitted by Devereux 
et al. (2002), since there are different forms of capital costs deductions. The 
investment tax credit of 10% had been abolished in the USA in 1986, although 
similar systems remain nowadays in countries such as the United Kingdom and 
Australia, where values range roughly between 30% and 50%, corresponding 
to values around 0.3. As Grossmann et al. (2010), we set this value equal to 0, 
as a benchmark exercise.
Finally, for the effect of technological progress on pollution, β, which is 
the focus of our study, we will perform considerable sensitivity analysis on it, 
always implying decreasing returns in influencing pollution, i.e. 0 < β < 1.We 
summarize the parameters for the calibration exercise in Table 1.
TABLE 1
CALIBRATION VALUES
Parameter
Basic Parameters
Benchmark/Reasonable
ρ 0.02
ψ 0.037
ω 0.833
β 0 < β < 1
ε 0.0792
τ 0.0285
σ 0
gY 0.0185
4.2. Results
In this section, we present the results from our calibration exercise. The 
next figure presents the allocation of human capital throughout the three sectors 
in the economy (human capital, differentiated goods, and R&D), for different 
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FIGURE 1
HUMAN CAPITAL ALLOCATIONS TO THE DIFFERENT SECTORS 
IN THE DECENTRALIZED EQUILIBRIUM AND IN THE 
SOCIAL PLANNER SOLUTION
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values of the effect of technology in decreasing emissions, the crucial effect 
on this paper. The decentralized equilibrium allocation to the human capital 
sector and to the differentiated goods sector is around 50% each, remaining 
nearly 0%, to the R&D sector. Although the first two are quite realistic values, 
the R&D share is quite low. As the parameters values that base our calibration 
were carefully chosen using international data or previous literature, this may 
be explained by the fact that the only use of R&D in this model is to reduce 
pollution. The optimal allocations of human capital to the differentiated goods 
sector begin near 35% (for low values of β ) and decrease steadily to nearly 
0.1%, while the allocation to R&D begin with a value near 0% and increase 
towards more than 35%. This pattern indicates a strong trade-off between the 
allocation of human capital to the human capital sector and the allocation to 
the R&D sector and in fact supports a heavy distortion towards decreasing 
pollution- R&D. The social planner would allocate up to 39% more human 
capital to develop new technologies that decrease pollution than the market 
does. Under the social planner solution, human capital allocated to the human 
capital sector does not oscillate a lot, decreasing from near 65% (when β is 
low) to near 50% (when β approaches 1).
We have performed a number of sensitivity analysis on the parameters that 
we now describe. Of particular interest are the parameters that could increase 
the share of human capital to the R&D sector to an interval of reasonable 
values. We tried to increase σ and we have concluded that for increases up 
to 50%, the value allocated to R&D does not increase significantly (with 
l0.5; 0 0.000574;de
Zβ σ= = ==> =  σ = ==> =l0.5 0.000583deZ ). The most 
significant change occurs with ω, which is the effect of pollution emissions 
in utility, internalized by the social planner. Reducing the value of ω would 
reduce the distortion, maintaining however the pattern shown in Figure 1 
above. For ω = 0.4, nearly half of the value used in Stokey (1998), the social 
planner would allocate up to 17% to the R&D sector, which compares with 
nearly 0% in the decentralized equilibrium. Due to the presence of markups in 
the economy it is even possible to obtain over investment in R&D. However, 
our quantitative exercise showed that this would occur for very low values 
of ω. In fact, maintaining the same calibration, with β = 0.5, we reach the 
conclusion that only with ω ≤ 0.014, is it possible to obtain overinvestment 
in R&D, i.e., a situation in which the optimal allocation to R&D is slightly 
below the market allocation to that sector.
5. Alternative Optimal Policy
The policies suggested by Grimaud and Tournemaine (2007) in Proposition 3 
are not correct in order to obtain optimality in the decentralized equilibrium, as 
the tax on the pollution emissions provides incentives to perform R&D in order 
to reduce emissions, but the markup in the differentiated goods sector implies a 
lower allocation of human capital to the differentiated goods sector than the one 
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that the social planner would provide. Comparing (1)-(2) and (3)-(5), Grimaud 
and Tournemaine (2012) have corrected the previously found policies2.
We may note that alternatively, the government can implement the tax-
policy as τ ω=β−Zt t  suggested by Grimaud and Tournemaine (2007) in 
their Proposition 3, but a new policy is necessary: a subsidy to human capital 
allocation in the differentiated consumption goods sector. In this case the firm 
would only pay (1 − s) of the wage, being the amount of the subsidy, s, paid by 
the government. This would change the firms’ maximization problem and, in 
the end, with s = (1 − α)/Q this distortion would be eliminated3. Thus, a policy 
mix with a tax on pollution emissions τ ω= βZ0 0  (with β=τg gZ  as mentioned 
above), a subsidy to the demand of differentiated goods (σ, as given above) and 
a subsidy to human capital employed in the differentiated consumption goods 
sector, α ( )= − = +s Q l l l(1 ) / / ,Z Z X  would implement the optimal solution 
on this model. These policies would yield the equation:
(9) ψ ρ
βτ ψ
φ τ α( )
( )
( )
+ =
−
− − −
−




β
β
−
−
l
Z l s
Z
Q
l
l
1
1 1 1
1
,H t t
H
t t
X
Z
equal to the optimal one (1) after substitution of the values of the policies.
This is an important conclusion as it means that the government may subsidize 
firms to hire human capital, implying that the policy mix may allow for the tax 
on pollution to fund (at least partially) the subsidy to human capital within firms 
and the subsidy to the differentiated goods’ demand.
6. Conclusion
This note uses the model from Grimaud and Tournemaine (2007, 2012) to 
study the quantitative implications of such a theoretical environment. In this 
sense, this note complements their article in providing a quantification of the 
distortions in the model. We also add to the literature on optimal investments 
in R&D providing a reason behind the result of underinvestment in R&D: the 
fact that R&D decreases pollution.
2 We must note that for the decentralized economy to reach the optimum with the 
implementation of the so-called optimal policies, one is always assuming that the 
Government is fully aware of all the distortions and can quantify them. In fact, some kind 
of uncertainty about some of the components of the economy (preferences, technologies) 
may lead to worst outcomes than the decentralized economy ones. In order to guarantee 
that the purposed policies are welfare improving, independently of reaching or not the 
optimal solution, the welfare effect of different policies should be calculated.
3 A complete proof for this claim is available upon request.
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We implement a realistic calibration exercise, which shows that the model 
predicts strong underinvestment in R&D, such that the policy maker would need 
to implement a strong tax-subsidy scheme to correct it. In particular, our exercise 
predicts that governments should increase the environmental tax several times 
its current value. We suggest that a subsidy to human capital can also decrease 
the gap between market and optimal allocations.
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